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Abstract. With our increasing dependency on computer-based systems,
ensuring their dependability becomes one the most important concerns
during system development. This is especially true for mission- and
safety-critical systems. Critical systems typically use fault tolerance mech-
anisms to mitigate runtime errors. However, fault tolerance modelling
and, in particular, rigorous definitions of fault tolerance requirements,
fault assumptions and system recovery have not been given enough at-
tention during formal system development. This paper proposes a devel-
opment method for stepwise modelling of high-level system fault tolerant
behaviour. The method provides an environment for explicit modelling of
fault tolerance and modal aspects of system behaviour and is supported
by tools that are smoothly integrated into an industry-strength devel-
opment environment. A case study is used to demonstrate the proposed
method.
1 Introduction
Our society is becoming increasingly dependent on computer-based systems due
to the falling costs and improving capabilities of computers. There is a class
of systems called critical that operate with resources of the highest value and
defects of which can have a significant impact on the environment, assets, and
human life. Critical systems have to be dependable [4], so that they can be
justifiably trusted to provide the required services.
It is well-known that one cannot produce a faultless system functioning in
a perfect fault-free environment [8]. A number of safety and reliability analy-
sis techniques are being successfully used nowadays in industry such as Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis, and HiP-HOPS. De-
terioration of physical components makes it necessary for systems to employ
fault tolerance mechanisms [8] in both hardware and software.
Furthermore, the design complexity of modern systems requires additional
means for reducing the number and criticality of design faults. One of the promi-
nent solutions to ensuring systems dependability by fault prevention and/or fault
removal is the inclusion of formal modelling in various stages of the software
development process. Usage of formal methods in development of dependable
systems is increasing and is proven to be cost-effective [12]. Among the main
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current obstacles to adopting formal methods by industry are the lack of tools
and engineers’ experience in formal development. We believe this situation can
be significantly improved by teaching best practices of modelling and providing
modelling guidelines and reusable solutions.
The development method proposed in this work builds on our study of the
requirements descriptions and formal models produced by deployment partners
of the FP7 DEPLOY project [2]. The study showed that up to 35-40% of require-
ments to critical systems can be devoted to fault tolerance. However, typically,
formal models do not adequately represent the fault tolerant behaviour due to
the fact that the fault tolerance component of requirements is intertwined with
the functional one and is difficult to address during the modelling phase.
There are a number of studies on formal modelling of fault tolerance. Some
research is done on extending original semantics of formal methods with addi-
tional fault tolerance modelling constructs [6]. Other techniques provide patterns
and modelling styles for modelling fault tolerance within the formal semantics
of a particular formalism [7].
We follow a pattern-based approach and propose a method for modelling
high-level fault tolerant system behaviour. In contrast to the above-mentioned
studies, we focus on reactive style of system-level fault tolerant behaviour, and
provide support for explicit reasoning about safety properties.
The paper is organised as follows. We give an overview of the proposed
method in Section 2. Then we describe the basic modelling principles behind
the method and the proposed refinement strategy in Sections 3 and 4 accord-
ingly. We describe the method by applying it to a case study in Section 5, and
draw conclusions in Section 6.
2 Overview
In this paper we demonstrate a method for top-down development of fault toler-
ant systems with a focus on abstract levels of modelling. The method focuses on
verification of safety properties of fault tolerant systems and ensures traceability
of the relevant safety and fault tolerance requirements.
The method accommodates two formalisms: a traditional state-based formal-
ism and a diagrammatic formalism from our previous work [10]. Any state-based
formalism with interleaving semantics can be used with the proposed method
such as Action Systems, B, Event-B, Z, and VDM with refinement-based for-
malisms benefiting the most. In this paper we exemplify our approach on the
Event-B formalism [3]. The second formalism used in the method constitutes
an additional viewpoint called Fault Tolerance (FT) Views for modelling modal
and fault tolerant behaviour [10]. The FT viewpoint is also refinement-based.
The refinement chains for the two formalisms coexist in a single development
and formally relate to each other. At each refinement level, the two formal mod-
els essentially represent the same system at the appropriate level of abstraction
(Figure 1).
The development method includes the following three constituents:
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Fig. 1: Refinement chain of a bi-model development
– the modelling principles stating the key rules and reasoning behind the mod-
elling process of the method,
– the refinement strategy defining a sequence of refinement steps that need to
be performed to arrive at a meaningful model of a fault tolerant system, and
– a set of modelling patterns and FT view templates that provide a reuse
mechanism during modelling.
The three constituents together represent modelling guidelines for building fault
tolerant systems in refinement-based formal methods in a systematic way.
3 Modelling Principles
The development method is based on a number of modelling principles. These
postulate a set of terms and rules that are used in definitions of modelling
patterns and the refinement strategy described later.
The first principle of the method defines the style for modelling fault tolerant
systems. The method facilitates the expression of safety properties by providing
patterns that follow a reactive style of modelling. By the reactive modelling style
we mean such a way of behaviour definition that uses atomic reactions and allows
developers to express high-level properties in the following form:
cause⇒ reaction
One of the most important principles used in the method is the principle of
behaviour restriction. We treat the system model as a transition system that is
”composed” of two parts: an unconstrained behaviour and a set of functional
and fault tolerance constraints. An unconstrained behaviour contains all system
states and all transitions, it is merely a declaration of the system structure
using variables. A model without constraints has a non-deterministic behaviour.
During its evolution, it can go from any state to any other state. In the proposed
method, the development departs from an unconstrained declaration of the state
space and step-wise arrives at a model which ”behaves” in a safe and sensible
manner within the given constraints, i.e. requirements.
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In our method, we assume that a system observes some part of its environ-
ment and reacts to its changes. To represent the environment adequately in the
models, we require all state transitions occurring during system execution to
satisfy the implementable causality rule: a cause (environmental change) must
not depend on a reaction (system change). In other words, a system being in
a certain state may not ”forbid” environment to change. Otherwise, the model
would contain unrealistic assumptions about system environment that cannot
be implemented.
To structure the formal development in such a way that follows the imple-
mentable causality and the behaviour restriction principles, we offer a term fault
tolerant component. A fault tolerant component is a structural system unit that
is described by its functional and error state variables which are explicitly sep-
arate in the model. In this regard, the term is similar to the Idealised Fault
Tolerant Component [8]. Note that an FT component is a modelling concept
and does not necessarily represent a physical object or a design-level module.
4 Refinement Strategy
The development method prescribes a number of modelling steps that need to be
performed to arrive at a correct and meaningful model of a fault tolerant system.
The schematic procedure of the development method is shown on Figure 2. The
development method is divided into two parts: the first part contains steps for a
generic development of reactive fault tolerant systems and is applicable in any
problem domain, the second part focuses on control systems and facilitates mod-
elling of low-level components with an intention to support the implementation
step.
Abstract modelling of a reactive fault tolerant system starts with defining a
failure-free functionality of the system (Step 1). By failure-free functionality we
mean the abstract behaviour that is only restricted by functional requirements.
At the first abstract level where fault tolerance requirements impact the
system model, a designer has to choose an abstract fault tolerance class of the
system (Step 2). We give more details on system FT classes in Section 5.2.
Steps 3, 4 and 5 form the core of the method. They are repeated iteratively
until all the required properties of the reactive system behaviour are expressed
and verified. Step 3 is a refinement of functionality which is project-specific.
Step 4 is called the fault tolerant component refinement : it refines the abstract
component errors and FT behaviour into sub-component errors. This step is
described in Section 5.3. Step 5 is the behaviour restriction step that is used
to restrict the functional behaviour with operational conditions dictated by the
environment. The details of this step are given in Section 5.4.
The second part of the method refines the reactive model into a model of
a control system. Here we reuse our previous work on modelling control cycles
and incorporating FMEA into Event-B specifications [11] and omit description
of this step due to space restriction. It is important to note that the first part
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Fig. 2: The steps of the method
focuses on verification of safety properties whereas the second part of the method
facilitates further implementation of the system.
5 Method Application
In this section we describe the steps of the proposed method applied to a run-
ning example. The example is an airlock system shown in Figure 3. We define
requirements to the system as a set of informal statements that we then formalise
using the proposed method.
5.1 Failure-Free Functionality
We start describing our system by defining its environment:
(ENV1) The airlock system separates two different environments (external and
internal). The pressure of the external environment is lower than that of the
internal one. The internal environment is considered to be natural to humans.
(ENV2) The system has two doors and a chamber (Figure 3). Each door when
closed separates the chamber from the appropriate environment.
The primary function of the system can be expressed in the following form:
(FUN1) When in operation, the airlock system must be able to let users pass
safely between the two environments via the airlock.
In order to allow a user to pass from the internal area through the airlock
into the external area, the system needs to perform the following steps:
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1. equalise the chamber pressure to that of the internal environment,
2. open the second door to allow the user in the chamber,
3. close the second door,
4. equalize the pressure in the airlock to that of the external environment,
5. open the first door to allow the user out,
and vice versa for the opposite direction.
To provide such operations, the system is equipped with a number of sensors
and actuators as shown on Figure 3. We assume that the details of such a
low level are given in requirements on which we base our abstractions. In this
paper, we omit the low-level modelling steps due to lack of space and focus on
modelling and proving safety properties at a high level of abstraction. We define
the following safety requirements for the airlock system:
(SAF1) The pressure in the chamber must always be between the lower external
pressure and the higher internal one
(SAF2) A door can only be opened if the pressure values in the chamber and
the conjoined environment are equal
(SAF3) At most one door is allowed to be opened at any moment of time
(SAF4) The pressure in the chamber shall not be changed unless both doors
are closed
At this stage, we only define the failure-free functionality of the system. That
is, no failures are considered and the system is assumed to work in a flawless
manner forever. We formalise the given requirements in an Event-B model M0
(see Snippet 1). In the model, section axioms contains axiomatic definitions
such as a given set of door states (opened, closed, etc). We represent the two
environments described in (ENV1) by their pressure values LOW PRESSURE
and HIGH PRESSURE that we assume to be constant. Section invariants
contains variable type definitions and safety properties that must always hold
during system evolution. For example, we represent the physical components
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axioms
axm1: partition(DOOR STATE, {OPENED}, {CLOSED}, {OPENING},
{CLOSING}, {STOPPED})
axm2: LOW PRESSURE = 0
axm3: HIGH PRESSURE = 2
invariants
inv1: door1 ∈ DOOR STATE
inv2: door2 ∈ DOOR STATE
inv3: pressure ∈ N
inv4: door1 6= CLOSED⇒ pressure = LOW PRESSURE
inv5: door2 6= CLOSED⇒ pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
inv6: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = CLOSED
inv7: pressure > LOW PRESSURE⇒ door1 = CLOSED
inv8: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE⇒ door2 = CLOSED
inv9: pressure ≥ LOW PRESSURE ∧ pressure ≤ HIGH PRESSURE
events
event open1 =̂
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
then
act1: door1 := OPENING
end
Snippet 1: Definitions, invariants, and behaviour of M0
from (ENV2) by variables door1 and door2 for the two doors correspondingly,
and the current value of pressure in the chamber by variable pressure. The rest
of the invariants correspond to the safety requirements. Namely, inv9 ensures
the pressure limits required by (SAF1). Invariants inv4 and inv5 correspond to
requirement (SAF2). Requirement (SAF3) is ensured by inv6. Invariants inv7 and
inv8 together represent (SAF4).
The events section formalises the behaviour of the system. It consists of a
set of events each of which represents a guarded labelled transition. The guard
of each event is given as a set of predicates in section when. When the guard
becomes true, the event fires thus atomically making a transition described in
section then by a set of assignments. The system evolves by making transitions
in an interleaving fashion. During evolution, invariants must always hold, and
the modeller is obliged to prove that the action of each event preserves all of
the invariants. In model M0, there are five events for each door that ensure
the safe traversal of the corresponding door through its set of possible states,
and two events for changing the level of pressure in the chamber. For brevity,
we only show an event of a door behaviour (open1) in Snippet 1. Event open1
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starts opening the first door if it is either closed or stopped at some intermediate
position.
5.2 Abstract Class of System Fault Tolerance
The next step is to identify the class of the system from the fault tolerance
perspective. In the proposed method, we identify two abstract classes of systems
from the fault tolerance modelling perspective: a class of failure-free systems,
and a class of safe stop systems. Any system belongs to one of these classes
depending on whether stop conditions are defined in requirements.
At this stage, we include an additional type of formal models into the de-
velopment process, Modal Views, and define a formal relationship with Event-B
models. A modal view consists of modes and mode transitions. A mode describes
the functionality of a system by its guarantee predicate, and the operating con-
ditions under which the system provides this functionality by its assumption
predicate. A mode is mapped into a set of Event-B events and represents a su-
perstate of a system. A mode transition represents an instantaneous switch of the
system between two modes. More details on formal definitions of Modal Views
and relationship with Event-B can be found in [10,5,1,9]. Here it is important
to understand that such a relationship between two different types of models
produces formal consistency conditions in a form of additional proof obligations.
These require developers to focus more on the modelling activity and, thus, add
rigour to the development process.
We associate the two classes of system fault tolerance with two possible
initial modal views accordingly (Figure 4). Systems of the first class can mask
all internal errors and operate indefinitely long. This is represented by a single
mode Normal. Systems of the second class cannot tolerate certain errors and can
eventually stop. The errors that can cause a system stop are called unrecoverable
and are collectively represented by the abstract transition to mode Stop.
Normal Stop
A:Ustopped=FALSE
G:Ustopped'=FALSE
Events:U<allUfunctionalUevents>
A:Ustopped=TRUE
G:Ustopped'=TRUE
Events:Ustopped
Normal
A:UFALSE
G:UTRUE
Events:U<allUfunctionalUevents>
a)
b)
Fig. 4: Two abstract classes of fault tolerant systems: a) Failure-free, b) Safe-stop
The airlock system so far contained only failure-free functionality reflecting
the absence of failures in requirements. Now we assume that some components of
the system can fail, and the whole system may eventually stop due to such errors.
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We accommodate this behaviour in model M1 (Snippet 2). We define variable
stopped representing the operational availability of the system, and separate the
functional behaviour from the stopped state by using this variable. We refine
all functional events by strengthening their guards and add two new events as
shown in Snippet 2. The changes we made to the model are generic in that they
are applicable to any safe stop system. These constitute the safe stop pattern
that should be applied as the first refinement step for modelling fault tolerant
behaviour in case of a safe stop system.
event open1 =̂ extends open1
when grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
event stop =̂
when grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then act stopped: stopped := TRUE
event stopped =̂
when grd: stopped = TRUE
then skip
Snippet 2: Part of M1 after applying the safe stop pattern
We also associate the modal view b on Figure 4 with Event-B model M1.
This produces additional formal obligations to prove for M1 and ensures that
the model indeed contains the safe stop behaviour.
The purpose of this refinement step is to ”reserve” an abstract representation
of the overall system fault tolerant behaviour for further refinements. Event stop
represents an abstraction of all unrecoverable errors that will be introduced later.
5.3 Fault Tolerant Component Refinement
On top of the functional requirements to the system, we also introduce a “fragile”
environment where the physical components of the system may fail:
(ENV3) Sensors and actuators may fail to provide a correct function.
From this fault assumption, description of sensors (which we omit due to
lack of space), and description of available redundancy in the system we can
construct an adequate abstraction for modelling. We define the three possible
error states of the two doors in model M2:
door1 cond,door2 cond : {BROKEN,DEGRADED,OK}
Such a definition of error states constitutes the error state variable pattern.
Fault assumption (ENV3) raises a number of requirements that concern system
fault tolerance:
(FT1) The system shall disallow opening a degraded door.
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(FT2) The system shall stop if at least one of the doors is broken.
(FT3) If both doors are degraded, the system shall stop unless there is a user
in the chamber. If the user is present in the chamber, the system shall allow
opening the inner door.
Normal
Door1 Door2Trapped
Stop
Break
Degrade
Degrade
Degrade
Degrade
Stopjonjdegrade Stopjonjdegrade
Userjleaves
refines Normal
A:jdoor1_cond=OKjᴧjdoor2_cond=OK
A:jdoor1_cond=OKjᴧ
jjjjdoor2_cond=DEGRADED
A:jdoor1_cond=DEGRADEDjᴧj
jjjjjdoor2_cond=DEGRADEDjᴧj
jjjjjobj_presence=TRUE
A:jdoor1_cond=DEGRADEDjᴧj
jjjjjdoor2_cond=OK
A:jdoor1_cond=BROKENjᴠjdoor2_cond=BROKENjᴠ
jjjj(door1_cond=DEGRADEDjᴧjdoor2_cond=DEGRADEDjᴧ
jjjjjjjobj_presence=FALSE)
Fig. 5: Modal view of the airlock M2 model
In order to represent these requirements formally, we refine the modal view
shown in Figure 4b by splitting the normal behaviour of the system into four
modes: the normal operation mode and three degraded modes (Figure 5). The
system stays in mode Door1 when the first door is degraded and the second
door is fully operational, and vice versa for mode Door2. When both doors are
degraded and there is a user present in the chamber, the system stays in mode
Trapped until the user leaves the chamber. The new mode Normal together
with the three degraded modes formally refine abstract mode Normal as shown
by a dashed area. Such a refinement of a mode by a chain of degraded modes
constitutes the mode split template. The degraded modes in Figure 5 represent
different sets of available components and the associated subsets of system be-
haviour. The assumption predicates of the modes split the possible combinations
of the components’ error states into disjoint sets. The mode assumptions cover
all the system states which must be demonstrated through the well-definedness
proof obligation COVER [1].
We refine the abstract system failure transition by four concrete transitions
depicting the sources of failure. Transitions Stop on degrade and User leaves
initiate at the new modes. Transition Break can initiate at any of the four modes
within the dashed area. All three formally refine the abstract error transition,
and this is an example of an application of the transition split template. The two
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templates shown here (mode split and transition split templates) provide a means
for step-wise construction of complex modal behaviour and ensure traceability
of modal views into fault tolerance requirements.
Modal view M2 represents fault tolerant behaviour of the system in terms
of its fault tolerant components, two doors and the chamber. In order to ensure
formal refinement between M1 and M2, we define a relationship between the
abstract error state variable stopped and the newly defined door error state
variables as a gluing invariant inv4:
door1 cond = BROKEN ∨ door2 cond = BROKEN∨
(door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED∧
obj presence = FALSE)⇔ stopped = TRUE
Definition of gluing invariants over error state variables constitutes the error
state invariant pattern. This pattern is necessary for establishing the refinement
relation between each two subsequent modelling steps. Note that the gluing
invariant also refers to functional variable obj presence that we introduced to
meet requirement (FT3). This variable shows whether a user is present in the
chamber. Such reference to a functional variable highlights the point that the
fault tolerance properties of the system are inevitably tied to the functional state
and both need to be taken into account during refinement.
event break =̂ extends stop
event degrade =̂
event stop on degrade =̂ extends stop
when
grd1: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∨ door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd4: door1 cond = OK ∨ door2 cond = OK
then
act1: door1 cond := DEGRADED
act2: door2 cond := DEGRADED
Snippet 3: The airlock M2 model after refining fault tolerant components
The defined error states are used in definition of fault tolerant behaviour
using the fault tolerant behaviour pattern: we refine the events that represent
the reactions of the system to errors by error detection events. In this way we
associate the causes of failures with system reactions. Snippet 3 shows three
events break, degrade and stop on degrade changing the door error states in
three different situations. Events break and stop on degrade extend abstract
event stop with actions putting the doors into degraded and broken states to
satisfy gluing invariant inv4. This shows how an abstract fault tolerant reaction
is refined into more specific component failures. Event degrade is new at M2, it
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changes the doors’ error states and continues the system operation. It represents
the tolerance of the system to certain errors. The three events represent a part
of requirements (FT1), (FT2), (FT3). Two events degrade and stop on degrade
depict the same abstract detection of a door failure but they lead to different
reactions, and the choice depends on the current system state. We have to have
both events in the model to cover all relevant system states at the moment of
component failure to satisfy the implementable causality rule.
Thus, error detection transitions are also system reactions: they change FT
components’ error states as well as functional states. Such behaviour conforms to
the reactive style of modelling and allows us to express safety properties which
include both functional and error states.
5.4 Behaviour Restriction
During the previous steps, we refined the error states of the airlock system
into error states of its components and defined events that provide transitions
between those states. However, the functional behaviour of the system does not
take the current error states into account. For example, a broken door can still
“operate” in our model M2 as if it was in a normal condition. In this step, we
remedy such an omission and restrict the functional behaviour to satisfy the
fault tolerance requirements.
Firstly, we refine the M2 modal view by applying the behavioural split tem-
plate to modes Door1, Door2 and Trapped (Figure 6). For example, mode
Door2 closing now restricts the system to only operate with the second door,
and only contains events that close or stop the door but do not open it. Upon
the door closure, the system switches to mode Door2 that guarantees that the
pressure is set to low and the door is closed, and thus only allows operating the
first door.
Secondly, in order to satisfy the consistency conditions enforced by the modal
view, we restrict the system behaviour expressed in the Event-B model. Specif-
ically, to satisfy proof obligation EV T A [1], we strengthen the guard of event
open1 by the following condition:
door1 cond = OK
We strengthen every event in model M3 in a similar manner thus ensuring that
(FT1) is satisfied. Such a restriction constitutes the behaviour restriction pat-
tern: we restrict the functional transitions that are not allowed with respect
to the error states of components. In this regard, we treat modal views as di-
agrammatic specifications of the system fault tolerant behaviour, and their as-
sumption/guarantee pairs as one of the two formalisations of fault tolerance
requirements.
The component refinement and the behaviour restriction steps are performed
in a top-down manner until the reactive model of the system contains the re-
quired safety and fault tolerance properties.
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closing
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closing door1
DegradedBroken
refines Door1 refines Door2refines Trapped
refines Stop
A: door1_cond=OK ᴧ door2_cond=OK
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A: door2_cond=DEGRADED ᴧ door1_cond=OK ᴧ 
     pressure=LOW_PRESSURE
G: pressure'=LOW_PRESSURE ᴧ door2'=CLOSED
Fig. 6: Modal view of airlock M3 model
6 Conclusions
Development of correct fault tolerance is a major challenge in designing complex
dependable systems as evidenced by major failures such as the crash of the
Ariane 5 launcher and the August 2003 Blackout in the US and Canada. Analysis
of these and more recent failures shows that a (typically substantial) support for
tolerating faults in many modern systems often fails or has a lower quality than
the rest of the systems.
In this paper, we described a top-down development method for formal mod-
elling of fault tolerant systems starting from the early stages of abstract mod-
elling and following to modelling control systems. The early consideration of
fault tolerance in refinement-based methods can reduce the modelling efforts,
and helps to ensure the overall dependability of the resulting systems.
The method proposed incorporates a separate viewpoint for modelling modal
and fault tolerance features of systems. This viewpoint adds rigour to the formal
development process, contributes to readability of formal models by engineers,
and bridges the gap between requirements and formal models. The method en-
sures the reuse of formal modelling by supporting patterns typical for modelling
fault tolerance. We demonstrated the application of the method by modelling
an airlock system. The refinement chain of the airlock case study consists of 5
Event-B machines and 3 associated modal views; overall the development pro-
duced 417 proof obligations, 356 of which were proven automatically. Most of
the rest 61 proof obligations that required interactive proof were generated by
the Rodin tools. The full Rodin project containing the models and views can be
downloaded from the Modal Views wiki page [1].
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The method is tool supported. The modal viewpoint is implemented as a
plug-in for the Rodin environment which includes a diagram editor and a smooth
integration with prover facilities [1].
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